I'm well known in my circle of friends as a military history geek - I read a lot of military histories and want to get my PhD in the topic. A friend made the mistake of asking me for my opinion on a counter-factual: what would have happened if Patton had taken MacArthur's place in the Pacific? And, hoo boy, did he get a lot more than he expected. So, for your amusement, here are my thoughts.
The original question:
"If MacArthur was replaced with, say, Patton, how would have the Pacific theatre have been different?"
Firstly, a disclaimer. I've studied MacArthur a lot more than Patton, so I can talk more fluently about his failings and strengths than I can Patton's, so bear with me. If you notice mistakes, please let me know in the comments.
There are a couple different premises that need to be considered to frame this question. When do we put Patton in the Pacific? Is Patton in charge of Philippine defense planning in the late thirties/early forties and command of the Philippine and American forces in 1941/1942, or does Patton take over SWPAC in 1942?
If we put Patton in the Phillippines, I could see Patton having a more realistic view of the situation and being prepared to fall back to Bataan, rather than MacArthur's doomed to fail effort to hold all of Luzon. I could also see Patton having a better understanding of air power and more self control and not losing as much of his air force on the first day. I could also see him being too aggressive and chauvinistic to ever put up with a protracted siege in Bataan and falling into some of the same traps as MacArthur. Eisenhower or Bradley would have been far better in this role than either of the two prima donnas, even if they would be ultimately be wasted in that doomed role.
I have enough to say about pre-WWII defense planning in the Philippines and what I see as MacArthur's lack of realism there to fill a book, let alone a blog post, but we're going to set that aside for now. Even in the best case scenario, we're talking about holding out in Bataan and keeping Manila closed for only a few extra months, so not a world shaking difference.
If you put Patton in command of SWPAC, I'm not sure what would happen. His end runs in Sicily show that Patton had some understanding of naval and amphibious power, but he might have been out of his element in a way that MacArthur ultimately was not. Patton's specialty was armored and mobile warfare and there was precious little scope for that in New Guinea or the Solomons and Bismarcks. Had the Japanese somehow landed in mainland Australia, Patton would have taken them to school, but that is such an impractical proposition that it's not really worth entertaining.
I could see Patton doing a bang up job commanding the liberation of the Phillippines in 44/45, especially the more mobile battles in Luzon. But by that stage of the war, it wouldn't have made a significant difference to the ultimate outcome.
Beyond just the terrain and environment, SWPAC was a theatre command, as opposed to an army or corps, and thus was a more political command. MacArthur had to juggle Nimitz's competing command, allied heads of state, the Australian population, and multinational subordinates and servicemen. Patton could be just as abrasive to colleagues, subordinates, and enlisted men as MacArthur. I do wonder if he would have had the same sort of friendly relationship with Prime Minister Curtin or the Australian commanders as MacArthur did in real life. I likewise wonder if he would have recognized the brilliance of Kenney, MacArthur's Original Time Line (OTL) air commander. Fun fact, the Air Corps offered MacArthur a choice between Kenney or Jimmy Doolittle, famous for the Doolittle Raid, for command of Fifth Air Force. It's speculated that MacArthur took Kenney because he resented Doolittle's fame.
I could see Patton not wanting to be subordinated to Nimitz, but he would have lacked the clout to resist it the way MacArthur did, so SWPAC might have been under Nimitz and King. In this case, the Pacific War may have been mostly a drive across the Central Pacific, with New Guinea and the Solomons relegated to a holding action, and with no liberation of the Phillippines until after the war. This wouldn't have prevented the same ultimate outcome of Japanese defeat, but it would have meant a more leading role for the Navy and Marines. Back to my original point, though, because Patton was never a theater commander in real life, we don't have a clear picture of how good he would have been with other services or allies.
Now, Patton being still alive and in charge in Korea instead of MacArthur is a different kettle of fish. We could very well end up with what I think is called a second-order counterfactual, where an alternate history plays out almost the same as in the original timeline. Patton had an ego of his own and was a big advocate of rollback. I could see him butting heads with Truman just as badly as MacArthur did and getting canned.
Now, if you really want to get wacky, place MacArthur in charge of the ETO. Firstly, there's no way Mac would agree to serve under his former subordinate, Eisenhower, nor would he have been as willing to let the British take the leading role in planning. I could see MacArthur showing up to the various conferences with his homework done, holding the group spellbound with his oratory and getting his way more than American generals were in the OTL. Would that mean an early, premature leap into the continent or, as in OTL, a protracted campaign against the "soft underbelly," analogous to his isolation of strongholds like Rabaul? I don't know how to weigh those two options.
I can say I believe MacArthur would have done better in Italy than Eisenhower. He would most likely not have put Mark Clark in command of Fifth Army or put up with his shenanigans once he was there. MacArthur, with his better understanding of amphibious warfare, also would likely have prevented the Anzio and Salerno landings from being the bloody wasted opportunities they were. And, despite his missteps in the Buna-Gona campaign, I could see MacArthur being imaginative enough to find a better way to handle the stalemate around Monte Cassino, if more successful landings had not prevented the stalemate in the first place.
I could see MacArthur doing just as well commanding in 1944 Normandy as Eisenhower, if not better. He might have been tempted by Market Garden, but I could see him a) spotting the unrealistic nature of the plan and b) not wanting the British to get the glory anyway. His campaign in Western Europe would probably be remembered for its brilliance.
Where thing's get really wacky are the closing phases of the war. This is where I'd like to recommend an alternate history series called "MacArthur's Luck." I could see MacArthur giving Patton (or a similar commander if Patton is still in the Pacific in this scenario) his head and being much more confrontational against the Soviets, choosing to race for Berlin and setting up a potential clash between the victors. The notion of him in charge of the Postwar occupation of Europe gives me visions of rollback and nukes dropped while America still had a nuclear monopoly.
So, uh, yeah, does that answer your question? I certainly have opinions.
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